Prompt injection is only the first failure mode.
Modern AI agents read context, call tools, update memory, use MCP servers, browse the web, write code, and trigger workflows. The missing layer is a Context Firewall between what they read and what they do.
The model you secured is not the model you shipped.
Context is now an attack surface. Every retrieved document, memory item, tool response, and MCP description can become instruction.
One input, one output. Guardrails on the prompt could catch most of the obvious abuse.
Every step in the loop reads untrusted content and can take a real action. The attack surface is the whole workflow, not the prompt.
The failure modes that live past the prompt.
Prompt injection is the entry point, not the whole threat model. These are the classes we replay against real agent workflows.
Built for teams searching: prompt injection protection · AI agent security · MCP security · agentic AI red teaming · context firewall · LLM firewall.
Stop treating agent security as a prompt problem.
Guardrails catch the obvious. Ultra13 controls the context-to-action boundary.